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The paper studies intercity trade and growth in an overlapping-generations economy
where tradeable goods are produced using a composite of capital, raw labor and interme-
diates, and are combined in each city to produce a composite. The composite is used for
consumption and investment. Tax-¯nanced investment that a®ects commuting costs endo-
genizes city size. A combination of weak (strong) diminishing returns and strong (weak)
market size e®ects can lead to increasing (decreasing) returns to scale. Autarkic urban
growth may be parallel or divergent. Capital growth in the integrated economy has the
same dynamic properties as its counterpart for an economy with autarkic cities but leads to
national constant returns to scale.
* This is an outgrowth of material from \Urban Structure, Intercity Trade, and Economic Growth," which
was presented at C.R.E.T.E. 2007, Naxos, July 2007 and the University of Cyprus, March 2008. I thank
Marcus Berliant, Drusilla Brown, Theodore Palivos and Marios Zachariades for very insightful comments.
The usual caveats apply.
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1 Introduction
The history of urbanization is closely related to intercity and international trade. Cities grow
as they trade with their hinterlands, and with other nearby as well as more distant cities. This
process at a national and indeed a global scale is not fully understood. The system-of-cities
literature analyses urban development by means of growth in the number of cities [Black and
Henderson (1999); Berliant and Wang (2004); Henderson and Ioannides (1981); Ioannides
(1994); Ioannides and Overman (2004); Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007)]. While changes
in the fundamentals may a®ect relative sizes of cities, it is a key feature of the system-of-
cities approach that urban growth occurs through creation of new cities as well as expansion
of existing cities. Naturally, the process of economic growth may alter the fundamental
determinants of equilibrium city size.
The role of trade in growth is one of the areas that have attracted attention by the new
economic geography and the endogenous growth literature. Since in some of those theories,
endogenous technological change is driven by specialization, which is in turn driven by the
extent of the market, economic openness is naturally underpinning growth in the extent of
the market. At the same time, urban economic activity, indeed urban life itself, has been
credited for providing one of the key innovation engines of the economy. Such a dynamic role
of the urban economy within a national economy has been slow to receive fuller attention, in
spite of recognition accorded to the work of Jane Jacobs (1969) by Robert Lucas and others.
Cities are assumed to take the price of the output in which they specialize as given.
This is consistent with both the model and reality, if there are many cities of each type,
as in Henderson (1974) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007). In this paper, too, each
city is specialized in a single tradeable product, that is produced under conditions of per-
fect competition. Still, the setting is compatible with terms-of-trade e®ects. Recalling the
terminology of Eaton and Eckstein (1997), we distinguish among the following logical pos-
sibilities. If as an economy's population grows, the number of cities grows but their relative
sizes do not change, then we say we have parallel growth; if the growth rate of smaller cities
increases relative to larger cities, then we have convergent growth; and if the size of larger
cities increases relative to those of smaller cities, then we have divergent growth. These
di®erent possibilities may be handled only by a model that contains key forces that drive
urbanization. Population growth with a constant number of cities increases congestion and
1reduces welfare and thus disturbs the existing equilibrium. Increase in intracity commuting
costs induces emergence of new cities. However, once cities have specialized, the taste for
product variety drive the appearance of additional cities, while intercity transportation costs
limit the process and acts as a force of agglomeration. There are centrifugal forces, namely
congestion and the attendant problem of wasteful commuting and congestion costs in the
form of higher rents, and centripetal ones, favoring fewer and larger cities. Generally, the
earlier new economic geography works ignored the fact that cities have been growing in size
and number, and the reasons why very large cities have appeared. Especially in the third
world, cities of a range of sizes may coexist with large diversi¯ed cities.
In the remainder of this paper we obtain a precise description of the law of motion in
dynamic settings of either autarkic or specialized cities. A combination of weak diminishing
returns and strong market size e®ects can lead to increasing returns to scale in each autarkic
city. We extend this model to allow for investment by local governments that reduces ur-
ban commuting costs. Under appropriate conditions, unceasing growth sustains a divergent
pattern in city sizes. We examine economic growth in an integrated economy, that is in the
presence of intercity trade in manufactured goods and free factor mobility within the urban
system. The law of motion for capital of the integrated economy has the same dynamic
properties as its counterpart for an economy with autarkic cities. Cities specialize and thus
an industry with greater economies of scale need not be weighted down and be forced to
compete for inputs with another industry, which exhibits lower economies of scale. However,
we show that when cities specialize, the advantage of specialization is exactly o®set by the
e®ect of its superior performance on the terms of trade. Di®erent specialized cities can grow
in parallel, just as autarkic cities can growth in parallel.
2 A Ventura-type Model of Intercity Trade and Eco-
nomic Growth
Our model of urban growth builds on the model of trade and growth in Ventura (2005), but
introduces cities. A number of distinct cities (subject to congestion, unlike Ventura's sites
or regions, or di®erent nations), may produce one or both of two tradeable goods X and
Y: Each of these goods are produced using physical capital, raw labor and intermediates.
The tradeable goods are not consumed directly. Instead, they are combined in each city to
produce aggregates, or composite goods, by means of Cobb-Douglas production functions
with shares ®; and 1 ¡ ®; respectively. The aggregates are in turn used for consumption
and for investment in physical capital. We start with the case of autarkic cities and refrain
2from indexing the respective quantities as long as no confusion arises. This speci¯cation
modernizes Henderson (1987; 1988) for the purpose of examining urban growth in particular.
It di®ers from Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) because of that paper's reliance on the
Lucas model to generate sustained growth. It di®ers from both the Henderson and Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright approaches because of its assumption that tradeable goods are not
consumed directly. It also allows comparison between autarky and intercity trade which
highlights the importance of intercity trade.
A number of individuals ¹ Nt are born every period and live for two periods. The econ-
omy has a demographic structure of the overlapping generations model. We simplify the
behavioral model as much as possible by assuming that the individuals born at time t work
when young, consume their net labor income net of their savings, and consume again when
they are old, C1t;C2t+1; respectively. While numerous re¯nements of the model are possible,
this basic one allows us to bring to the fore the key tradeo®s associated with growth. We









Net labor supplied by the members of the young generation in a particular city at t is







; with Nt the number of the members of the young generation
in a particular city at t; · ´ 2
3¼¡ 1
2·0, and ·0 the time cost per unit of distance traveled.1







Wt; where Wt denotes the wage
rate. Let Rt+1 be the total return to physical capital, Kt+1; in time period t+1; that is held
by the member of young generation at time t: To the above utility function there corresponds











We assume that capital depreciates fully in one period. Under the above utility function,
the young save a fraction S of their net labor income. The productive capital stock in period
t + 1; Kt+1; is equal to the total savings of the young at time t: Therefore, to preview our








1If individuals commute to the CBD, consume a unit of land each, and the city extends circularly around
it, a city of N residents has a radius ¼¡ 1
2N
1
2: If individuals are endowed with one unit of leisure and a unit
of distance traveled costs ·0 units of time, then an individual who travels distance r to the CBD is left with















3We develop ¯rst the case where all cities are autarkic, that is no intercity trade, and
thus produce both ¯nal goods, and use them in turn to produce the composite used for
consumption and investment.
Each of the ¯nal goods, J = X;Y; is produced by a Cobb-Douglas production function,
with constant returns to scale, using a composite of raw labor and physical capital, with
elasticities 1¡ÁJ; and ÁJ; respectively, and a composite made of intermediates. The shares
of the two composites are uJ;1 ¡ uJ respectively. There exists an industry J¡speci¯c total
factor productivity, ¥Jt: Production conditions for each of two industries J are speci¯ed via






















where QJt is the total output of good J = X;Y; PZt is the price of the typical intermediate,
elasticity parameters uJ;ÁJ satisfy 0 < uJ;ÁJ < 1; and the elasticity of substitution in the
intermediates composite ¾ is greater than 1. The total factor productivity ¥Jt; summarizes
the e®ect on industry productivity of geography, institutions and other factors that are
exogenous to the analysis.2
Each of the varieties of intermediates used by industry J are produced according to a
linear production function with ¯xed costs (which imply increasing returns to scale) using
the same composite of physical capital and raw labor that is used in the production of
manufactured goods X and Y: The shares of the productive factor inputs used are the same















and ZJt(m); the quantity and price of the input variety m used by industry J = X;Y: Its
price is determined in the usual way from the monopolistic price setting problem,4 and it is















At the monopolistically competitive equilibrium with free entry, each of the intermediates












per unit to produce. Its
producer earns zero pro¯ts.
2This speci¯cation combines Anas and Xiong (2003) and Ventura (2005).
3This may be generalized to allow for input-output linkages by requiring (see also Fujita, et al. (1999),
Ch. 14), that each intermediate good industry use its own composite as an input. This is accomplished by






on the r.h.s. of the cost function bit(ZJt):
4Dixit and Stiglitz (1976).
43 Growth with Autarkic Cities
We examine ¯rst economic growth in an integrated economy consisting of autarkic cities,
where each city produces both manufactured goods. When these are available in quanti-
ties QXt;QY t; the quantity of the composite good that may be used for consumption and






In order not to clutter up notation, we will index cities only when it is necessary. The natural
numeraire to use is, just as in Ventura, the composite output itself in every city. Its price is
set equal to 1:
Pt ´ 1 ´
µPXt
®




Therefore, PtQt = Qt ´ PXtXt + PXtYt; and:
Qt = Ct + Kt+1:
The ¯nal good industries X and Y receive share of aggregate spending ®;1 ¡ ®; respec-
tively, of which fractions 1¡ÁX;1¡ÁY; respectively go to labor. Therefore, aggregate labor








= (1 ¡ Á)Qt; (6)
where
Á ´ ®ÁX + (1 ¡ ®)ÁY:
Clearly, 0 < Á < 1:
In order to characterize economic growth by means of a law of motion for industrial
capital, we express in terms of capital all endogenous quantities that would enter the law
of motion. Working with the production function of each ¯nal good industry, the output{















The range of intermediates used in the production of good J; mJt; which is referred to as the
technology, is endogenously determined in the model and may be expressed as a function of









5This result may be interpreted as follows. Increased factor use raises incentives to specialize,









where the auxiliary variable ¹J;
















is an augmented measure of industry¡J total factor productivity.
We note that ¹J(1¡ÁJ) > 0; the exponent of labor in (8) above, is positive. Intuitively,
increase in labor used raises the output{capital ratio, as the direct positive e®ect of making
physical capital more productive is reinforced by the indirect e®ect of increasing input variety.
Increases in physical capital, on the other hand, have an ambiguous e®ect on the output{
capital ratio, as the sign of ¹JÁJ ¡ 1 is ambiguous. The direct negative e®ect of making
physical capital abundant and the indirect positive e®ect of increasing input variety work
in opposite directions. Depending upon the magnitudes of market size e®ects, indicated by
¹J; and diminishing returns, ÁJ; that is, if ¹JÁJ < (>)1; increases in physical capital reduce
(increase) the industry's output capital ratio.
Next, in order to derive an expression for the aggregate output capital ratio as function of
the aggregate quantities of labor and physical capital, we express industry allocations of pro-
ductive factors, HXt;HY t and KXt;KY t; respectively, in terms of their respective aggregate









where ®X = ®; ®Y = 1 ¡ ®: By using these expressions in the right hand sides of (7), the










where ¹ is de¯ned as
¹ ´ ®¹X + (1 ¡ ®)¹Y = 1 +
1 ¡ (®uX + (1 ¡ ®)uY)
¾ ¡ 1
> 1;
6and À is the \covariance" between ¹J;ÁJ;
À ´ ®(¹X ¡ ¹)(ÁX ¡ Á) + (1 ¡ ®)(¹Y ¡ ¹)(ÁY ¡ Á) = ¡®(1 ¡ ®)
1
¾ ¡ 1

































Equ. (9) is the e®ective aggregate production function, in that it gives the output{capital
ratio for the entire economy after the endogeneity of the range of intermediates (technology)
has been accounted for. Just as with the individual ¯nal goods industries, increases in labor
have unambiguously positive e®ects on the output{capital ratio, because: ¹(1¡Á)¡À > 0:
Increases in physical capital, on the other hand, have ambiguous e®ects on the output-capital
ratio. If the \representative" industry has strong diminishing returns and weak market-size
e®ects, ¹Á + À < 1; then increasing physical capital reduces the output{capital ratio. If
the \representative" industry has weak diminishing returns and strong market-size e®ects,
¹Á + À ¸ 1; increasing physical capital increases the output-capital ratio.
Since young individuals save a fraction S of their labor income, which aggregates to
(1¡Á)Qt; and given the expression for the e®ective aggregate function (9), we have the law
of motion for the autarkic urban economy:







This shows that each autarkic urban economy obeys a Solow growth model with a Cobb-
Douglas production function that exhibits increasing returns to scale, as the sum of the
factor share coe±cients satis¯es ¹ ¸ 1:
There is a total number of autarkic cities in the economy at time t; i 2 It: The only
modi¯cation needed in the above theory is to account for the net quantity of labor available








: The law of motion (10) in city i becomes:














It is straightforward to show that output of city i satis¯es a similar equation,
Qi;t+1 = ^ ¥i;tQ
¹Á+À
i;t ;
where ^ ¥i;t; a function of parameters, is de¯ned as follows:
7At long run equilibrium with free entry, city i would be populated by the maximum
possible population,5 which is given by 4
9·
¡2
i ; and is therefore proportional to ·
¡2
i : As we
shall see further below, the factor multiplying ·
¡2
i : may di®er, depending upon the intercity
trade regime. Suppose that each city is populated with the number of young people that
maximizes net labor supply and that the young share housing with the old. Suppose, also,
that local geography is uniform, so that commuting costs are the same across all urban sites:






The higher the commuting costs or the larger the national population, the more cities are
needed. This is in a nutshell the counterpart here of the case of urban growth as analyzed by
Henderson and Ioannides (1981). Unlike their case, however, in this model even if national
population is constant, sustained growth is possible, provided that the \representative"
industry has weak diminishing returns and strong market-size e®ects.
3.1 Investment in Urban Transportation
It is reasonable to assume that ·; the unit transportation cost parameter that was de¯ned
in Section 2, may be a®ected through investment in physical capital. This assumption is key
to our results. We take no position at the moment on whether or not this would be public
capital or private capital. We assume that unit transportation cost · may be reduced by
means of investing physical capital in the transportation system. We posit that
·i;t+1 ´ ~ ·i (Nitkg;i;t+1)
¡´ ; ´; ~ · > 0; (12)
where (~ ·i;´) denote parameters, and kg;i;t+1 physical capital per young person at time t
invested in the transportation system (unit transportation capital, for short). Investment
undertaken at time t becomes productive in t+1: The unit transportation cost tends to zero
asymptotically and in a convex fashion, as total transportation capital tends to in¯nity.
This assumption has important consequences for our model and our results. In particular,
the maximum net labor supply and the young population of city i become functions of






5Alternatively, we may choose city population so as to maximize indirect utility of the typical individual
at each point in time, given by (3). Using (11), we may express Ri;t+1; the gross return to capital in terms
of Ni;t; as well. In the absence of free labor mobility, setting city populations in this fashion would ¯t
better a utility maximizing local government. Even in this case, however, the resulting optimum is inversely
proportional to the unit commuting costs, with the coe±cient of proportionality being di®erent, naturally.
8where n¤
i = 4=9 1
~ ·2
i : Transportation capital, like production capital, is assumed to depreciate
fully after one period.
We assume transportation investment takes the form of the same composite that is used
for consumption and investment in the production of goods. From among a whole host
of possible ways to ¯nance transportation investment, we assume (for simplicity) that the
government of city i levies a lump sum tax equal to kg;i;t+1 per young individual, which it
uses to ¯nance investment in transportation. Therefore, the law of motion for capital (10)
becomes:
Ki;t+1 = (1 ¡ Á)SQi;t ¡ Ni;tkg;i;t+1:
We assume that the government of city i sets the amount of transportation investment so
as to maximize utility of the typical member of generation t; given by (3). At the capital
market equilibrium in city i; the gross return to physical capital is equal to marginal product









Since net labor supply at time t + 1 is proportional to ·
¡2
i;t+1; it may be written in view of











[(1 ¡ Á)SQit ¡ Ni;tkg;i;t+1]
¹Á+À¡1
#S
[(1 ¡ Á)Qit ¡ Ni;tkg;i;t+1]N
¡1
i;t :
Maximization of indirect utility of a young person with respect to ki;g;t+1 yields that total
investment in transportation, Ni;tkg;i;t+1; is a constant share of city labor income (1 ¡ Á)Qit
and given by 6:
Nitkg;i;t+1 = ~ ´(1 ¡ Á)Qi;t; (13)
where ~ ´ is a root between 0 and S of the quadratic equation with constant coe±cients,
(1 + S
¤ + ^ S)~ ´
2 ¡ (S + S
¤ + ^ S + S ^ S)~ ´ + S ^ S = 0; (14)
6To see that, taking the log of the maximand above, for simplicity, and then di®erentiating it with respect





(1 ¡ Á)SQit ¡ Ni;tkg;i;t+1
¡
Ni;t
(1 ¡ Á)Qit ¡ Ni;tkg;i;t+1
= 0;
where the auxiliary variables ^ S;S¤ are de¯ned as in the main text. This reduces to a quadratic equation in
the unknown quantity Ni;tkg;i;t+1: It is more convenient to seek a solution, equivalently, for the unknown as
~ ´ ´
Ni;tkg;i;t+1
(1¡Á)Qit ; transportation investment as a share of labor income. The resulting quadratic equation has
time invariant coe±cients.
9where
^ S ´ 2´(¹(1 ¡ Á) ¡ À)S; S
¤ ´ S(¹Á + À ¡ 1);
which is de¯ned entirely in terms of parameters. In view of the properties of all the auxiliary
parameters we have that the quantity
¹(1 ¡ Á) ¡ À =
1
¾ ¡ 1
[¾(1 ¡ ®ÁX ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ÁY) + ®ÁXuX + (1 ¡ ®)ÁYuY]
is positive. Therefore, ^ S > 0: It can be shown that a root exists of (14) such that 0 < ~ ´ < S;
provided that S¤ > 0; for which it su±ces that the returns to scale are su±ciently strong to
ensure that ¹Á+À > 1: Just as before, this can occur if the \representative" industry of the
city has weak diminishing returns and strong market size e®ects.
Therefore, with total investment in transportation being a fraction of total output of city
i; the law of motion for productive capital becomes:
Ki;t+1 = (1 ¡ Á)(S ¡ ~ ´)Qi;t: (15)
The evolution of city income implied by the law of motion may be characterized as follows.
Using the expression for productive capital in period t + 1 from (15) as a function of city i
output at t; and using (13) to express net labor supply also as a function of city i output at
t, along with the expression for the output{capital ratio from (9), we obtain the following














[~ ´(1 ¡ Á)]
2´(¹(1¡Á)¡À) [(1 ¡ Á)(S ¡ ~ ´)]
¹Á+À :
Clearly, because ¹(1 ¡ Á) ¡ À is positive, a su±cient condition for the economy of city i
to exhibit increasing returns to scale is ¹Á + À ¸ 1; which is the same condition as for
the economy without transportation investment to exhibit increasing returns to scale. A
necessary condition may also be obtained. The larger is ´; the more e®ective is transportation
capital investment in reducing unit commuting costs, and the more likely it is that the
economy of city i exhibit increasing returns to scale.
3.2 Divergent versus Convergent Autarkic Cities
How do city sizes vary over time, when transportation investment is endogenous? A key
result of the paper is to characterize exactly the pattern of evolution of city sizes. With total
10transportation investment evolving according to (13), the optimal number of young at time
t + 1; our de¯nition of city size, is
ºi;t+1 = n
¤
i (~ ´(1 ¡ Á)Qi;t)
2´ ; (17)









By using the law of motion for city output derived earlier (16), we may rewrite this in terms







This renders endogenous the growth rate of city size and provides a direct relationship
between the growth rate of city size from time t to period t + 1 to the growth rate of city
output from t¡1 to t, which in view of (16) may be written in terms of city output in period
t ¡ 1: We note that Zi;t is larger the smaller is parameter ~ ·i in unit commuting costs. So,
a particular advantage of a city's urban transport system, perhaps due to local geography,
is translated to a growth e®ect for the sizes of the respective city type. Relative growth
rates depend on respective output ratios. Growth rates of cities are constant, increasing or
decreasing, depending upon whether city output is constant, increasing or decreasing.
An important consequence of endogenizing urban transportation costs, and therefore city
size as well, is that the number of cities is also endogenous. This implies, in turn, that if (16),
the law of motion of city output, exhibits increasing returns to scale, then city sizes will grow.
This follows from the fact that increasing returns to scale in city output are ensured if ¹Á+À
exceeds 1, while ¹(1 ¡ Á) ¡ À is always positive. This is due to increasing returns to scale
in the urban economy, which originate, of course, in the speci¯cation of technology through
the use of intermediates. Consequently, whether or not the number of cities grows depends
on the rate of growth of population relative to the (endogenous) rate of growth of city size.
Furthermore, the economy here consists of a number of autarkic, that is independent cities,
which implies a great variety of possible outcomes.
Returning to the typology of Eaton and Eckstein (1997) and referring to (16) and (18),
we may note the following about urban growth rates in the long run. Parallel growth would
be a knife-edge case, where parameter values allow for a steady state, that is constant city
output over time. This requires decreasing returns to scale in city output:
2´(¹(1 ¡ Á) ¡ À) + ¹Á + À < 1;
11(and constant Zi;t). In that case, urban growth rates would be equal to zero in the long
run. If parameter values give constant returns to scale, that is, if the exponent of city i
output in (16) is exactly equal to 1, then the growth rate of city output is Zi;t+1¡1; and the
corresponding growth rate in the number of cities is (Zi;t+1)
2´ ¡ 1: In that case, we would
have parallel growth only if the parameters Zi;t are constant and equal across all cities. In
the case of increasing returns to scale, that is if the exponent of city i output in (16) is
greater than 1, we have divergent urban growth, as urban growth rates are larger for large
cities. We conclude that convergent growth is not possible in the long run in this model.
Convergent growth may well be consistent with transient dynamics, however.
3.3 Economic Integration, Urban Specialization, and Growth
Equ. (11) demonstrates that in addition to di®erences in terms of city-speci¯c total factor
productivities, the ¥¤
i;t; cities may also di®er in terms of congestion parameters ·i: If indi-
viduals are free to move across cities, then a spatial equilibrium requires that individuals
be indi®erent as to where they locate. That is, individuals' lifetime utilities are equalized
across all cities. This implies in turn conditions on intercity wage patterns. That is, unlike
the canonical case in Ventura, op. cit., wages will typically di®er across cities at spatial
equilibrium. Similarly, if capital is perfectly mobile, it will move so as pursue maximum real
returns and in the process equalize them across all cities.
We refer to the case where capital and labor are free to move as economic integration.
With economic integration, industries will locate where industry productivities, the ¥Jt's
are the most advantageous ones, and capital will seek to locate so as maximize its return.
Unlike the consequences of economic integration as examined by Ventura, op. cit., here
urban congestion may prevent industry from locating so as to take greatest advantage of
locational factors. Aggregate productivity is not necessarily equal to the most favorable
possible in the economy, because free entry of cities into the most advantageous locations
may be impeded by competing uses of land as alternative urban sites, at the national level.
However, utilities enjoyed by city residents at equilibrium do depend on city populations,
and therefore, spatial equilibrium implies restrictions on the location of individuals. We
simplify the exposition by assuming that all cities have equal unit commuting costs ·:
We take up ¯rst resource allocation under the assumption that cities specialize in the
production of tradeable goods. Urban specialization and intercity trade are very important
phenomena.7 We examine the case when each specialized city also produces intermediates
7Alexandersson (1956) establishes the facts about specialization of U.S. cities and Henderson (1974)
provides the ¯rst model of the system of cities as trading entities.
12that are used in the production of the traded good. Let QXit;QY jt denote the total quan-
tities of the traded goods X;Y produced by cities i;j; that specialize in their production,
respectively. The situation is symmetrical for the two city types, and therefore, we work
with a city of type X: We suppress subscripts that are redundant and write for the nominal
wage and the gross rate of return in an X¡city:
WXt = (1 ¡ ÁX)
PXQX
HX




where PX denotes the local price of traded good X; which is expressed in terms of the
local price index, the numeraire. We follow Ventura and again adopt the ideal price index
as numeraire, which is equal to one in all cities. We also assume initially that there are no
intercity shipping costs for traded goods. With economic integration, the gross rate of return
is equalized across all city types, that is:
Rt = RXt = RY t:
Spatial equilibrium requires that indirect utility, (3), be equalized across all cities. In view







































Therefore, the full set of conditions for economic integration imply a relationship between











Alternatively, since the ratio of city populations,
NXit
NY it; is known at any point in time, eco-











13The demand for good Y by a city of type X is given by the share of income of city of
type X divided by PY: It su±ces to work with the equilibrium conditions for intercity trade
in good X; which may be simply stated as the share of spending on good X by all Y cities
















(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ÁY)
: (25)
This condition, along with the total labor supply condition, nXNX +nYNY = ¹ N; yields the









(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ÁY)
®(1 ¡ ÁX) + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ÁY)
: (26)
Interestingly, the relative frequencies of the two types of cities di®er, cet. par., between the
static and dynamic cases, only if ÁX 6= ÁY; that it, the capital intensity of production di®ers
among the two manufactured goods. The more labor intensive good requires a greater share
of population.
We may now solve for capital allocations in the two types of cities by using in addition






1 ¡ ®ÁX ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ÁY
®ÁX + (1 ¡ ®)ÁY
:
Next we compute the real income of the two types of cities. For a city of type X this






: By using (21) to obtain an expression for the terms of trade, the
























: The real income of a city specializing in good X; Xt;
may be expressed, by using (8), in terms of city populations of both types of cities, (NX;NY);





























the function of parameters b ¥t is de¯ned as:












1 ¡ ®ÁX ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ÁY
®ÁX + (1 ¡ ®)ÁY
!®¹XÁX+(1¡®)¹Y ÁY
;
and the functions of parameters ¹ ¥Xt; ¹ ¥Y t were de¯ned earlier. The counterpart of (27) for



































3.3.1 Law of Motion for Integrated Economy
We derive the law of motion for total capital in the integrated economy by recalling that







: This implies that total savings
by both types of cities is given by the share of labor income that is saved: nXS(1¡ÁX)PXQX
and nYS(1 ¡ ÁY)PYQY: Therefore, the law of motion for capital becomes:





An important result readily follows from a comparison of (31), the law of motion of the
integrated economy, with (10), its counterpart for each autarkic urban economy. That is,
the elasticity of total savings with respect to capital for those respective cases coincide:
¹Á + À ´ ®¹XÁX + (1 ¡ ®)¹YÁY:
The intuition of this result may be explained as follows. In the integrated economy, cities
specialize and thus an industry with greater economies of scale need not be \set back" and
be forced to compete for resources with another industry, that exhibits lower economies of
scale. However, when a city specializes, the advantage of specialization is exactly o®set by
the e®ect of its superior performance on the terms of trade. In fact, it is a telling sign that
this is even "mechanically" so in the above derivations. This, of course, follows from the
15fact that the terms of trade, PX=PY are evaluated at the general equilibrium of the national
economy.
With free movement of labor, individuals seek to maximize their lifetime utility and
therefore city populations would tend to their optimum sizes. It is easy to see that this is
equivalent to maximizing the value of a city's output. The optimum city sizes follow from
the maximization of NX; with respect to NX; and NY; with respect to NY; for X¡ and Y ¡
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·2: (33)
It is important to note that the factors that multiply 1
·2 in the expressions above di®er from
4
9; the one under autarky, the alternative trade regime we examined earlier. Accordingly,
the relative frequencies of the two types of cities are determined from (25) as functions of
parameters. However, a simple comparison shows that specialized cities are larger than
autarkic cities. That is, specialization confers an advantage because an increase in market
size allows each industry to support a higher degree of specialization and is accommodated
by larger city size.
In the canonical case of an integrated economy of many cities, even if goods and cap-
ital move at negligible cost, individuals might not be able to move accordingly, because
of \capacity constraints" in cities (in e®ect). Any geographical distribution of production
and factors is possible provided that capacity constraints are satis¯ed. Capacity constraints
prompt of course creation of new cities, a process that is implicit in our approach [Hender-
son and Ioannides (1981)]. In general, sites may di®er in terms of e±ciency, re°ected in the
commuting cost parameter. So, unlike the canonical case examined by Ventura, op. cit.,
here it is indeed possible to determine production or spending located in each city. This is
one of the instances where the system of cities approach di®ers from the standard setup of
international trade theory.
It is straightforward, yet algebraically tedious, to show that other things being equal,
specialization improves welfare relative to autarky. This follows simply from comparing city
output under autarky and under specialization, from (9) and (27), respectively. As with
utility comparisons discussed earlier, given the same unit commuting cost, city sizes are
assumed to be equal among each type of cities in the specialization case, on one hand, and
16for all autarkic, on the other. Introduction of iceberg shipping costs, for either ¯nal goods
or intermediates, does not change these results qualitatively.
A number of remarks are in order. Our treatment of autarky in the growing economy
does not assume | in contrast to Anas and Xiong (2003) | intercity trade in intermediates.
Here, each city's industries produce the intermediates it uses in its own production. It
is still the case with intercity trade and growth, where cities of either type still produce
the intermediates they need and do not import any other intermediates from other cities
of the same type. This assumption deprives cities of the bene¯ts of a greater variety of
intermediates, which over time may grow with the number of cities, but does not a®ect the
returns to scale properties. It is made in order to be able to focus on intercity trade in goods.
3.3.2 Constant Returns to Scale Property at the National Economy
Factor mobility and economic integration alters the economies of scale properties of the
model. In particular, we may write real national income as the sum total of real incomes
generated in each city, from (27) and (29), respectively, multiplied by the number of cities
of each type,
Qt = nXtXt + nY tYt: (34)
At the optimum city size, the right hand side becomes proportional to
(Kt)
®¹XÁX+(1¡®)¹Y ÁY ¹ N
1¡[®¹XÁX+(1¡®)¹Y ÁY ]:
Therefore, the national economy exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to total cap-
ital and labor, (Kt; ¹ N): This is, of course, a con¯rmation in a Dixit-Stiglitz inspired setting,
of the result of Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007), which is obtained in a Lucas-inspired
setting. It is in contrast to Ventura (2005), where integration alters the substitutability
among factors, and depends critically on the assumption that there is no congestion for sites
that are suitable for urban use, at the national level. The creation of new cities is the margin
that eliminates local increasing returns, when they would have been present, and thus con-
fers constant returns to scale at the level of the aggregate economy. This is exactly like the
description of industry equilibrium with free entry of ¯rms, each operating with U-shaped
average cost curves, may be described as operating with constant returns to scale, with unit
cost being equal to the minimum average cost.
Finally, we speculate about possible uses of our results. The availability of the law of
motion for the autarkic and for the intercity trade case in closed form, and the fact that
they share the same returns to scale properties lend our approach nicely to modeling urban
business cycles. With industry-speci¯c stochastic shocks, the behavior of aggregate output
17is di®erent in the case of autarky versus the case of intercity trade. In addition, without
necessarily introducing unemployment, one may study the e®ects of labor market pooling,
when the shocks to the two industries are imperfectly correlated. Such issues have not been
examined in the literature. So, in principle, when both types of shocks coexist, one may
partially o®set the e®ect on prices thus conferring an advantage to autarky, which then
allows for diversi¯cation of risks, relative to intercity trade. In this sense, then, the structure
of stochastic shocks to industry productivity may give rise to an advantage of autarky versus
specialization.
3.4 Investment in Urban Transportation with Specialized Cities
Just as with diversi¯ed cities, we retain assumption (12) and consider how investment in
urban transportation, ¯nanced out of lump-sum taxes in each type of city, may be chosen so
as to maximize utility of a typical member of generation at each period in time. Just as in
the earlier analysis in (3.1), we assume that city populations are chosen so as to maximize
city output, for each type of city. This yields expressions (32 { 33).
By using the expressions for factor prices from (19) and for output-maximizing city sizes
from (32) { (33) in the condition for spatial equilibrium across the two types of cities (20),
we obtain expressions for utility of young members of generation t who reside in type ¡X





























where ~ ® ´ ®¹XÁX + (1 ¡ ®)¹YÁY; and the expressions for NX;t;NX;t+1;NY;t;NY;t+1 are
obtained from (28), (30), respectively. Since equalization of the ¯rst term on each side above,
the gross returns to capital, which ensures capital market equilibrium, has already been














The law of motion, (31), is modi¯ed to account for investment in urban transportation:




¡ nXNX;tkXg;t+1 ¡ nYNY;tkY g;t+1:
(310)
18Maximization of utility of the typical resident in each type of city with respect to
kXg;t+1;kY g;t+1; separately, and subject to the spatial equilibrium constraint yields a solution
via one of the roots of a quadratic equation.8 We may specify parameter restrictions under















; respectively, that is less than the respective wage rates.
Unfortunately, the solution for in the case of specialized cities does not admit a par-
ticularly simple expression, unlike in the case of diversi¯ed cities. Still, it follows that
kXg;t+1;kY g;t+1; scale with labor income per capita in each type of city. Some qualitative
properties readily follow. In view of expressions (32) { (33) both lagged transportation in-
vestments kXg;t;kY g;t; enter via (28), (30) in the solutions for kXg;t+1;kY g;t+1: This suggests
presence of spillovers across the two types of cities in the optimal setting of transportation
investment. These spillovers are due, in e®ect, to the pecuniary externalities associated with
use of intermediates in production, which make in turn the terms of trade depend on sizes of
both types of cities. This force is not present in the case of autarkic cities and necessitates
re¯nement of the concept of optimum city size in the presence of intercity trade. The solu-
tion may also involve complex dynamic dependence, as may be expected from the quadratic
solution.
4 Brief Summary and Conclusions
The paper adapts the Anas{Xiong (2003) static model of urban structure and combines it
with key features of the model of trade and growth in Ventura (2005) in order to explore
intercity trade and growth. The economy is populated by identical individuals and is assumed
to have an overlapping generations demographic structure. Individuals work when they are
8Speci¯cally, by substituting for kY g;t+1 from the condition that expresses equalization of wages into (31')
and then using the resulting expression for Kt+1 in each of the expressions for utility in (35), we may obtain
necessary conditions for utility maximization in the form of quadratic equations. For kXg;t+1 speci¯cally,
this equation is:
(2S´(®¹X + 1 ¡ ®) + S(~ a ¡ 1) + 1)k2
Xg;t+1 ¡
£
(2S´(®¹X + 1 ¡ ®) + S(~ a ¡ 1)) ¹ WXt
+((2S´(®¹X + 1 ¡ ®) + 1) ¹ Kt+1
¤
kXg;t+1 + 2S´(®¹X + 1 ¡ ®) ¹ WXt ¹ Kt+1 = 0;
where we have ignored some inessential constants and de¯ned the auxiliary variables ¹ WXt; ¹ Kt+1 as follows:























The quadratic equation for kY g;t+1 is symmetrical.
19young and consume in both periods of their lives. They work where they are born, but
may move in the second period of their lives. Cities produce either one or both of two
tradeable goods. These goods are used to produce a composite, which is used in turn for
¯nal consumption and investment. The manufactured goods are produced using raw labor,
physical capital and intermediates. In the autarkic case, each city is self-su±cient in both
the manufactured goods and intermediates used in their production. Capital comes from the
savings of the young. Our assumptions allow us to obtain a precise characterization of the
law of motion, just like in Ventura (2005). So, a combination of weak diminishing returns
and strong market size e®ects can lead to increasing returns to scale in each autarkic city.
We extend the model of autarkic cities to allow for investment by local governments that
reduces intra-urban unit commuting costs and thus makes city size depend on equilibrium
in the capital market. We are able to solve for transportation investment in closed form.
Under appropriate conditions, unceasing growth sustains a divergent pattern in city sizes.
Finally, we examine economic growth in the presence of intercity trade in manufactured
goods and free factor mobility. Individuals will locate so as to equalize utility and capital
so as to equalize returns. In the integrated economy, cities specialize and thus an industry
with greater economies of scale need not be weighted down and be forced to compete for
resources with another industry, which exhibits lower economies of scale. However, when
cities specialize, their specialization advantage is exactly o®set by the e®ect of its superior
performance on the terms of trade, under our assumptions. We also extend the model of
specialized cities to allow for investment by local governments to reduce commuting costs.
This reveals that there are spillovers across city types that must be recognized in setting
optimal city size. Di®erent specialized cities grow in parallel, just as autarkic cities can
growth in parallel. One of our key results is that the law of motion for capital of the
integrated economy has the same dynamic properties as its counterpart for an economy with
autarkic cities. The key results of the paper are exploring conditions for divergent versus
convergent urban growth under alternative intercity trade regimes.
There are numerous issues which fall within the broader scope of the paper and de-
serve further attention. The study of the urbanization process along with intercity economic
integration, the relationship between di®erent patterns of shipping costs and patterns of
specialization, and issues of policy stand out as particularly important. Patterns of special-
ization among cities map to di®erent predictions about urban hierarchies and associated city
size distributions. Another issue of particular importance is modeling proximity between
cities and possible competition among alternative sites.
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